



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA** §  
§  
v. § **CASE NO. 1:03-CR-155**  
§  
**MANUEL CARBAJAL-PEREZ** §

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(I) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Manuel Carbajal-Perez, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Ron Clark. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* requesting the revocation of Defendant's supervised release. The Court conducted a hearing on April 23, 2009, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that Defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his

supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

### **STATEMENT OF REASONS**

#### **A. Procedural History**

On January 28, 2004, The Honorable Ron Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sentenced Defendant after he pled guilty to the offense of deported alien found in the United States, subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction, a Class C felony. Judge Clark sentenced the Defendant to sixty (60) months imprisonment followed by a 3-year term of supervised release subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include: as a condition of supervised release, immediately upon release from confinement, the defendant shall be surrendered to a duly authorized immigration official for deportation proceedings in accordance with the established procedures provided by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, *et seq.* If ordered deported, the defendant shall remain outside of the United States. In the event

the defendant is not deported, the defendant shall comply with all conditions of supervised release; financial disclosure; drug aftercare; and a \$100 special assessment. On December 28, 2007, Manuel Carbajal-Perez completed his period of imprisonment and began service of the supervision term.

**B. Allegations in Petition**

The United States alleges that Defendant violated the following mandatory condition of supervised release:

*The defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime.*

Specifically, on or about February 1, 2009, Mr. Carbajal-Perez was arrested by King County Sheriff's Department, Seattle, Washington, for the offense of driving under the influence.

**C. Evidence presented at Hearing:**

At the hearing, the Government offered the following evidence as its factual basis for the allegations set out *supra*. The Government offered, as an exhibit, the offense report from King County, Washington, dated February 1, 2009. That report shows that Manuel Carbajal-Perez was arrested on that date for driving under the influence (DUI) after he was pulled over in a vehicle by a Washington State Patrol officer. The report also establishes that Mr. Carbajal-Perez failed voluntary sobriety tests at the scene and that he took a breath test which showed his blood alcohol level was over the legal limit at that time.

Defendant, Manuel Carbajal-Perez, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, Defendant agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegation that he committed a state crime in violation of his supervision conditions.

**D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition**

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised

release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by committing the state crime of driving under the influence (DUI).

Having found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Carbajal-Perez violated his supervision conditions by committing a state crime, the Court further finds that this violation constitutes a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke Defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2). Based upon Mr. Carbajal-Perez' criminal history category of IV and the Grade C violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from six (6) to twelve (12) months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two (2) years. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id.* *See also United States v.*

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<sup>1</sup> *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

*Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and Defendant's own admission supports a finding that he violated his supervision conditions. The Court, therefore, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant committed a Grade C violation of his supervision conditions by committing a state crime. Mr. Carbajal-Perez knowingly and voluntarily pled true and agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for that violation.


Accordingly, based upon Defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate further recommends that the District Court order Defendant to serve a term of **nine (9) months imprisonment**. The Court finally recommends that Mr. Carbajal-Perez receive no further supervision term upon his release.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Within ten (10) days after receipt of this report, any party may serve and file written objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within ten (10) days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from *de novo* review by the District Judge of the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations, and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court except on grounds of plain error. *Douglass v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (*en banc*); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 28th day of April, 2009.**



Keith F. Giblin  
KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE